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## **ПЕРЕДАЧА И СОЗДАНИЕ ЗНАНИЯ В СОВРЕМЕННОМ УНИВЕРСИТЕТЕ**

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Аннотация: автор убежден, что в современном университете необходимо развивать науку как «теоризацию практик». Нам необходимо признать нередуцируемую гетерогенность

социальных практик, что означает, что мы не должны больше замыкаться в образовательной или трансляционной практиках в пределах этой институции. Приводятся примеры того, как эта процедура работала в истории социальных и гуманитарных наук.

Abstract: the author suggests that it is necessary to develop science in contemporary University as «theorisations of practices.» We need to recognize the irreducible heterogeneity of social practices, which means that we no longer need to be closed in an educational or translational practices within this institution. Examples of this procedure realization in the history of social sciences and humanities are provided.

Ключевые слова: современный университет, социальные и гуманитарные науки, теоризация практик.

Keywords: contemporary University; social and human sciences; theorisations of practices.

I will speak about institution of University, and the present ambiguities that are being fomented and provoked around its status and within its practices.

For a long time, we have been living in the shadow of the Enlightenment, and we naively believed that knowledge is a value in itself. It was a very comfortable position for professionals of knowledge, what professors are. Even on occasions or in periods of ideological censorship, the censorship could not squarely say that this or that portion of knowledge should be deleted, should be omitted because it was ideologically not

adequate, but had to try to prove that ideologically inappropriate knowledge was no knowledge at all. So, by the logic of the things, we as specialists of knowledge even in those hard situations had a relatively comfortable position, and we definitely had an upper hand for the past 200 years.

This is no more the case. Knowledge is no more a self-evident value in itself. If for a long time the question that the university people and the governments were asking themselves was how to make as much knowledge as possible available to the largest number of people, the questions that are now posed are like the following: how much knowledge, for whom, how fast, what is the cheapest way. We can see this institutional questioning of old certainties all around us: new educational and research institutions are emerging outside the university, they are often more competitive than the old academic apparatuses, they offer fast courses, swift trainings, they focus on well-defined target groups, and their offer is for well-defined practical purposes. The university itself is not only under the pressure of outside competition, it has also imposed upon itself the governmentally prescribed self-reform. In the European Union right now, a huge continent-wide university reform is going on, called the 'Bologna process'. It is cutting down the duration of the studies, it is trying to adapt the output of the university to the requests of the labour market, and it is also cutting down public funds available to public education. So we have good reasons to ask

ourselves about the purpose and the future of our basic activities and operations: the production and transmission of knowledge.

However, it would be hypocritical to consider that we only have to do that because of external pressures. There were at least two very strong challenges to the university and to knowledge that were coming from within. One was the criticism by the student movements in the 60s and the 70s, and the other was the theoretical critique developed by Michel Foucault and his followers. Both the students and Foucault were denouncing the academic knowledge for its part in the processes and practices of oppression and exploitation in contemporary society. But the interesting feature is that they were denouncing the academic institution and its knowledge for contrary reasons. For students, their knowledge was irrelevant, rigid, sterile, and archaic, and ultimately without practical application, except for its role in the reproduction of an obsolete institution – the University. For Foucault, knowledge was creating its own domains of application, its own relevance – it was too active, too greedy to catch subjects and to submit them. For the students, university knowledge was closed into ivory towers of academic elites; for Foucault it was active in the mechanisms of microphysics of power that reaches into every corner of our lives, our bodies, and our existence. The students denounced the ‘law and order’ ideology, the castration of life, the vampire and dead nature of school knowledge – while

Foucault, on the other side, kept warning: no, this is a knowledge which stimulates life, it models and regulates life, it controls large populations by the way of bio-politics.

After 30 or 40 years of this critique, it is time to take it seriously. Let us take a step back and ask ourselves about the logic of the development of the social sciences and the humanities. Maybe it is in this way that we can find a way out of the present situation, without necessarily falling into the pessimism of a scholar like Michel Foucault, or without having to make another revolution of 1968.

A commission which was investigating the present state of the social sciences and whose chairman was Immanuel Wallerstein, our colleague in sociology, described the paradigm of social sciences in the following way:

There were three clear lines of cleavage in the system of disciplines erected to structure the social sciences in the late nineteenth century:

- the line between the study of the modern/civilized world (history plus the three nomothetic social sciences) and the study of the non-modern world (anthropology, plus Oriental studies);

- within the study of the modern world, the line between the past (history) and the present (the nomothetic social sciences);

- within the nomothetic social sciences, the sharp lines between the study of the study of the market (economics), the state (political science), and civil society (sociology).

Each of these lines of cleavage came to be challenged in the post-1945 world 5. P. 360

What is interesting in that understanding of the social sciences is its Platonist dieretic scheme which we can graphically present in the following way:




Figure 1: The system of social sciences

If we put it in this way, we see that sociology has a double status because it belongs both to the 'bad' line of history, anthropology, political science, and to the 'good' line of mathematised 'exact' (and ethnocentric) social sciences which culminate, of course, in economics. The institutionalized system of social sciences is the exact historical accumulation of failures to realize an ideal to which only economics to a certain extent approaches.

In 1706, a conservative social thinker, a professor of rhetoric at the Naples Royal University, Giambattista Vico, already noticed this internal clash within the sciences <sup>3</sup>. In his view, there was a method which was developed by the Ancients, and this he called the topical method. Contrary to this age-old method, the Moderns were, as Vico acutely noticed, developing the method proposed by Mr. Cartesius, and this he called the modern critical method. This critical method is, of course, modelled upon the exact natural sciences, upon the Galilean physics. While the topical method takes its inspiration from the ancient rhetoric and the juridical science which both presume that things human always and by their very nature allow for differing and mutually exclusive descriptions that cannot be reduced to each other. Scrutiny of human affairs is a matter of perspective, of the point of view, of the places (*topoi*) from where one looks at them. In human affairs, the most one can strive for is, at least according to the Ancients, to find ways of co-existence and of the necessary co-operation among the irreducibly differing human positions.

In early modernity, the topical method was recaptured and splendidly articulated within the new modern paradigm – the philological paradigm. Although it had produced important results, it has been disqualified by the advent of Galilean physics, and further marginalised by Cartesian philosophy. It was only during the nineteenth century that philology could again claim scientific dignity with comparative and historical linguistics and with the new social sciences. The development of linguistics led to Saussurian paradigm – the splendid effort of philology to incorporate the modern critical norm. Saussurian linguistics has demonstrated its force, and its limits, during the twentieth century. It now seems to be an obstacle, rather than an incentive to the theorisation of symbolic practices.

Social sciences, on the other side, have been a compromise formation from the very beginning. As a consequence, their problem has been that their Galilean ideal has not corresponded to their object and to their practical preoccupations of knowing this object. That is why they have been repeating their attempts at a solution, and have repeatedly failed. This has been almost a necessary development of a compromise formation which arose when the paradigm of ‘the Humanities’, *studia humanitatis* that existed in the form of the *septem artes liberales* during the Middle Ages and that started really to flourish under humanism – when this traditional paradigm came under the attack of the modern paradigm introduced by the Galilean physics and its exact mathematical



method 4.

At that moment the humanities broke down into one branch which is philology and which went its own way surviving as the study of language and its formations. While the other line, after having itinerated through centuries without much success, finally led towards the swift series of consecutive constitutions of sciences from the late 18th till the end of the 19th centuries, towards the series which resulted in the 'system' of social sciences, still dominating our institutions. That is why the scheme on the board (Figure 1) is systemic, not historical. Historically, the first social science to constitute itself was economics, and it was already the object of a critical scrutiny at the moment when anthropology only started its epistemic constitution. It is utterly simplifying to squeeze epistemic processes into chronological straight-jacket. Still, there are coincidences that are noteworthy at least as mnemonic devices. Adam Smith published the founding book of economic science *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776) at the time when Johann Gottfried Herder was writing his first texts that were to infuse a new momentum into philological endeavours by investing them with the key importance for *Nationalbildung* (essays from 'Über die Ursprung der Sprache', 1770, to 'Über die Wirkung der Dichtkunst auf die Sitten der Völker in alten und neuen Zeiten', 1778). In the same year 1859, when Karl Marx first made public his project of the critique of political economy,

Lewis Henry Morgan sent out his circular letter to collect data on kinship systems world-wide, containing his paper.

The last to emerge was sociology, with Durkheim and *Année sociologique*, at the end of the century – to complete the ‘system’. Sociology, the complementing supplement of the system, is also the social science which most obviously harbours both strands of the system, the mathematical-statistical norm and the ambivalent, perspective-dependent topical approach to human reality. In its microcosm, sociology reflects the unsolvable dilemma of the system as a whole, its driving force and its bad consciousness. It is in this field that may testify to the ultimate defeat of the social sciences, where I am involved as sociologist and where my achievements lay for which the Paissiy Hilendarski University has so generously awarded me the Doctorate *Honoris Causa*.

I have taken some time to show you the trap and the critical situation, and I will be much faster in proposing my solution, which is also the answer to the question what to do about the transmission and production of knowledge nowadays, in the contemporary situation.

My idea was to start from here, from the iterated bifurcation as the formal feature of the system of social sciences. There seems to be the root of the problem. Let me re-design this recurring split in general terms, not in its specific occurrences:




Figure 2: the logic of the system

Constitutive opposition of the system is the opposition between the topical and the critical paradigms. The system is driven by the desire to achieve the critical ideal: at each of the consecutive attempts the system generates a new science which proves to be just another topical construction. And the machine starts again from the same opposition. This sedimentation of failures defines the field we call ‘social sciences’.

The logic of the system presents as irresolvable the contradiction between the topical and the critical methods, so lucidly diagnosed by Vico three hundred years ago. However, it is not, as Vico imagined, a contradiction between the method of the Ancients and the method of the Moderns. Vico’s intuition and, to be frank, Wallerstein’s sophisticated systemisation are only savage theorisations of two types of practices. The

one is the predominantly technological practice directed toward the mastery over nature, while the other is the savage theorisation of practices that are operated within a human environment. I am actually falling back to the old Aristotelian distinction between the astral world where things are eternal and necessary, and the sub-lunar, human world where, as Aristotle wittily says, things can be such or other 1, where there is no knowledge of eternal and necessary laws because it is a world of production, of practice and decisions, of freedom. While here, at the other branch of the bifurcation, at the side of the 'critique', there is the astral world, the world where necessity and eternal laws are normally ruling. My son who is a physicist says that this is no longer true: but this does not affect my thesis.

My proposal is that we should shift from a savage theory to self-reflected theory and, to be very precise, to start conceiving theoretical preoccupations as theorisations of practices. We have several examples of precisely this procedure already in the history of social and human sciences. The one I will mention is Freud's constitution of psychoanalysis. As you know, Freud and his colleague Breuer were practicing at the very beginning a therapeutic method which was called the cathartic method. The success of the cathartic method depended upon the patient's falling in love with the therapist. So the therapeutic success of this method depended on its being unsuccessful as therapy, because a therapy which depends on the

patient's love for the medicine man is, of course, not successful.

This posed quite hard ethical questions to Breuer and to Freud, and Breuer could not stand it and he gave up. Freud, on the other side, was a much more arrogant person, and he theorised this situation and invented the concept of transference. In Freudian psychoanalysis, the analysis is terminated only when the relation of transference is dissolved. And at this point we will again mobilise the conceptual tools provided to us by Foucault. In Foucault's terms, Freud was occupying the position of medical authority onto which the truth of the patient is being alienated 2. In a traditional medical relation it is the medical doctor who tells the patient the truth about her or his illness. Freud's ingenious insight was that by occupying the position of alienation of the truth he did not for this reason know the truth any more than the patient. The truth was in the discourse that was coming from the patient to the analyst, but in order to come to this truth Freud operated a topical shift, that is, he constituted the position of the therapist into the point from where the discourse of the patient bounces off and comes back to the patient as the truth of her or his unconscious.

So, to come to the point of my talk, what we need to do at the university today is to produce our sciences, our theories as theorisations of practices. What we need is the recognition of the irreducible heterogeneity of social practices, which means that we should no more remain closed into the

unique educational or transmission practice within the institution.

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## LABORATORY OF MEMORY

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Аннотация: лаборатория памяти как методологический проект намерена поделиться, адаптировать и экспериментировать на европейском уровне «Лаборатория памяти», лабораторная модель межпоколенной деятельности (с участием учителей / преподавателей, студентов и старших), направленная на обновление